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Administrative agencies are increasingly establishing voluntary self-reporting
programs both as an investigative tool and to encourage regulated firms to commit
to policing themselves. We investigate whether self-reporting can reliably
indicate effective self-policing efforts that might provide opportunities for
enforcement efficiencies. We find that regulators used self-reports of legal
violations as a heuristic for identifying firms that are effectively policing their
own operations, shifting enforcement resources away from voluntary disclosers.
We also find that firms that voluntarily disclosed regulatory violations and
committed to self-policing improved their regulatory compliance and
environmental performance, suggesting that the enforcement relief they received
was warranted. Collectively, our results suggest that self-reporting can be a
useful tool for reliably identifying and leveraging the voluntary self-policing
efforts of regulated companies.

*

The authors are grateful for insightful comments from Cindy Alexander, Xiang Ao, Lee Fleming, Neil Fligstein, Brian Galle,
Guy Holburn, Rob Huckman, Bob Kagan, Andrew King, David I. Levine, John W. Maxwell, Howard Shelanski, Bill Simpson,
Jason Snyder, Matthew Stephenson, Kathy Zeiler, participants of the 2007 Harvard-Boalt-UCLA Junior Faculty Environmental
Law Workshop, and Senior Policy Fellows of the Georgetown Center for Business and Public Policy. Ara Abrahamian and
Katherine Lee provided outstanding research assistance. We gratefully acknowledge support from the Division of Research and
Faculty Development at the Harvard Business School and from the Center for the Study of Law and Society at Berkeley Law,
University of California, Berkeley.

1

1. Introduction
Administrative agencies have established, over the past two decades, self-reporting
programs that mitigate penalties for companies that voluntarily disclose their legal violations.
The U.S. Department of Defense-sponsored Contractor Disclosure Program reduces penalties
for companies that self-report procurement fraud. The Inspector General of the U.S. Health and
Human Services Department administers the Provider Self-Disclosure Protocol, a leniency
program for voluntary disclosers of Medicare and Medicaid violations. The U.S. Department of
Justice’s Leniency Program relaxes sanctions against companies that self-report antitrust
violations. The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency’s (EPA) Audit Policy encourages the
voluntary disclosure of environmental violations.

And the Federal Energy Regulatory

Commission recently established guidelines for submitting Self-Reports admitting license
violations.
These programs provide regulators with valuable information about legal transgressions.
The Department of Justice, for instance, characterizes its Leniency Program as its “most
effective investigative tool,” claiming that “[c]ooperation from leniency applicants has cracked
more cartels than all other tools at our disposal combined” (Hammond 2005).

Although such

enforcement leverage is no doubt part of their appeal, most of these programs have much broader
ambitions. They seek to encourage not only self-reporting, but investment in self-policing
practices, or internal efforts to monitor employees’ activities, that will pay dividends in improved
future compliance. The Defense Department’s Contractor Disclosure Program, for example, is
explicitly designed “to encourage self-policing” (U.S. Department of Justice 1997). The Federal
2

Energy Regulatory Commission likewise looks beyond the immediate violation reported,
observing that “self-reports also detail the steps taken to cure the violation and to prevent any
recurrence” (Federal Energy Regulatory Commission 2007: 18). Similarly, the stated objectives
of the EPA’s Audit Policy include encouraging “corporate compliance programs that are
successful in preventing violations [and] improving environmental performance” and helping to
“enhance protection of human health and the environment” (U.S. Environmental Protection
Agency 1995: 66706, 66712). And the Department of Health and Human Services describes its
self-reporting program as seeking to “promote a higher level of ethical and lawful conduct
throughout the health care industry” (U.S. Department of Health and Human Services Health
Resources and Services Administration 1998: 58399).
Such ambitions appear lofty, especially at a time when the self-regulatory capacities of
corporations have been exposed as woefully inadequate in so many arenas. In the wake of major
bank failures and a broader financial meltdown, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC)
eliminated its voluntary supervision program for investment banks, with Chairman Christopher
Cox noting: “The last six months have made it abundantly clear that voluntary regulation does
not work” (Labaton 2008: A1). Similarly, the EPA recently shut down Performance Track, its
flagship voluntary program, after media reports charged that the program was nothing more than
a “public relations charade” (Shiffman, Sullivan and Avril 2009: A1). Academic research
likewise suggests a cautious approach to self-regulation, with most studies finding no evidence
that self-regulation programs improve regulatory compliance (Ebenshade 2004; Pirrong 2000;
Pirrong 1995; Vidovic and Khanna 2007; Welch, Mazur and Bretschneider 2000) and some
documenting worse performance by firms purporting to engage in self-regulation than by those
not making such claims (King and Lenox 2000; Rivera, de Leon and Koerber 2006).
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This article investigates whether the mechanism of coupling voluntary self-reporting with
a commitment to self-police can overcome some of the demonstrated limitations of other
voluntary regulation approaches. Specifically, we ask whether voluntary disclosure of selfdetected compliance violations can reliably indicate to regulators effective self-policing efforts
which might warrant a reduction in regulatory scrutiny of the disclosers. These questions lie at
the nexus of theories of self-reporting, self-policing, regulatory enforcement, and information
disclosure.

We extend these bodies of literature by theorizing and empirically testing the

relationship between self-reporting and self-policing.
We analyze these questions in the empirical context of the EPA’s Audit Policy, a selfreporting program which offers penalty mitigation to regulated entities that voluntarily disclose
legal violations discovered through systematic self-policing, and in the enforcement context of
the U.S. Clean Air Act, one of the most widely applicable federal environmental statutes. First,
we ask whether regulators actually use self-reports of legal violations as a heuristic for
identifying firms that are effectively policing their own operations, shifting enforcement
resources away from voluntary disclosers. We then investigate whether such enforcement relief
would be warranted, based on self-reporters’ subsequent regulatory compliance and
environmental performance. We find that regulators reduced their scrutiny over self-reporting
facilities, which suggests that regulators used these voluntary disclosures as an indicator that
facilities were engaging in self-policing activities. The agency subsequently reduced both the
frequency and probability of inspections of voluntary disclosers relative to inspection rates at
similarly situated, non-disclosing facilities. We further demonstrate that firms that voluntarily
disclosed regulatory violations and committed to self-policing improved their regulatory
compliance and environmental performance. Specifically, they were subsequently cited for fewer
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regulatory violations by agency inspectors and subsequently experienced fewer accidental
releases of toxic chemicals than a matched set of non-disclosers. These results suggest that, on
average, self-reporters to the Audit Policy also engaged in effective self-policing. Collectively,
our results suggest that self-reporting can be a useful tool for reliably identifying and leveraging
the voluntary self-policing efforts of regulated companies.

2. Literature Review: Self-Reporting and Self-Policing
Despite a great deal of economic scholarship on both self-reporting and self-policing,
these issues generally have been addressed separately and neither has been empirically linked to
regulatory outcomes.

Several economic models have been developed that illustrate how

regulatory schemes can be designed such that voluntary self-reporting enhances enforcement
efficiency. Kaplow and Shavell (1994: 593), for instance, show that, “given any enforcement
scheme...without self-reporting, there exists a scheme with self-reporting under which behavior
is the same but enforcement costs are lower.” In their model, voluntary self-reporting reduces
enforcement costs because regulators need not expend resources to catch those who confess.
This extension of Becker’s (1968) probabilistic enforcement model allows regulators to maintain
a given level of deterrence while decreasing inspection rates. Various extensions of the Kaplow
and Shavell (1994) model demonstrate that self-reporting can also enhance social welfare by
eliminating the costs self-reporters might otherwise incur to evade detection of (and resulting
punishments for) legal violations (Innes 2001a; Innes 2001b) and by ensuring that self-reported
violations will be remediated (Innes 1999).
A parallel body of scholarship focuses on how firm-level self-policing can contribute to
overall deterrence levels. Arlen (1994) and Arlen and Kraakman (1997) generate the key insight
5

that the deterrence of harmful acts is a function not only of government enforcement efforts, but
also of firms’ internal efforts to monitor their employees’ activities, or to “self-police.” They
argue that, although company managers are often better positioned than the government to
prevent and detect legal violations perpetrated by their employees, the prevailing structure of
corporate criminal liability dampens their incentives to do so, resulting in less-than-optimal
deterrence of corporate criminal conduct (Arlen and Kraakman 1997). This view holds that
optimal deterrence depends on properly calibrating the internal and external tiers of enforcement
activity. Arlen and Kraakman (1997) suggest that the magnitude and applicability of criminal
sanctions should be designed to encourage corporate investments in self-policing. Pfaff and
Sanchirico (2000) apply this insight in the regulatory context, noting that self-auditing can be
more comprehensive and efficient than periodic regulatory inspections, and arguing that
regulators should adjust fines to encourage the practice.
Although this scholarship identifies some important dynamics that underlie self-reporting
and self-policing, the two practices remain largely distinct in the literature and their connection
to improving compliance or reducing harm is unclear. For example, Kaplow and Shavell’s
(1994) foundational model of self-reporting does not address, and its results do not depend on,
the existence or effectiveness of self-policing at self-reporting firms. The efficiency gains
identified in this model derive solely from the reduction in enforcement costs realized when
firms self-report and thus remove themselves from the pool of firms the regulator must
investigate.

Pfaff and Sanchirico (2000) look beyond self-reporting to the importance of

encouraging self-policing by regulated companies, but the enforcement efficiencies they identify
are also achieved via regulators’ enhanced detection capabilities.

They argue that internal

investigations associated with self-policing create paper trails that facilitate regulators’

6

investigations. Accordingly, like Kaplow and Shavell (1994), their models avoid the question of
whether self-policing can encourage firms to proactively remedy problems or deter harmful
conduct.
Unfortunately, the kinds of enforcement efficiencies theorized for self-reporting can be
difficult to realize in practice. Short and Toffel (2008) demonstrate that facilities “voluntarily”
self-reported violations and committed to self-policing only after regulators had invested a
disproportionate amount of enforcement resources to inspect and prosecute them, potentially
cannibalizing any ex post gains that might be realized. Moreover, even ex post gains can be
elusive in a complex regulatory state, where legal violations are often chronic and result from
either technological or compliance management deficiencies. Merely reporting such lapses does
not necessarily mean the problem has been remedied, so regulators cannot automatically remove
self-reporters from the pool of firms to be monitored, as the police can do, for instance, when a
suspect confesses to murder in the criminal context. For these reasons, it is important to
investigate the internal deterrent effects of self-policing as an alternative mechanism for
economizing enforcement resources while maintaining overall deterrence levels in the regulatory
context.
Leveraging deterrence gains from firm-level self-policing efforts has been challenging
both because there is wide variation in firms’ motivations and capacities to police themselves
and because regulators cannot readily observe self-policing behavior to assess it for themselves.
While some research on voluntary regulation has suggested that firms can reduce the harmful
effects of their activities by adopting internal compliance management practices (Innes and Sam
2008; Khanna and Damon 1999; Sam, Khanna and Innes 2009), other studies suggest that, on
average, purportedly self-regulating firms do not measurably improve their performance

7

(Alberini and Segerson 2002; Darnall and Sides 2008; Ebenshade 2004; Koehler 2007; Lyon and
Maxwell 2007; Pirrong 2000; Pirrong 1995; Rivera, de Leon and Koerber 2006; Vidovic and
Khanna 2007; Welch, Mazur and Bretschneider 2000) and sometimes actually perform worse
than their non-self-regulating counterparts (King and Lenox 2000; Rivera, de Leon and Koerber
2006). Because firms’ internal self-policing practices are not readily observable, regulators may
not be able to distinguish effective from ineffective self-policers. This has made it exceedingly
difficult for regulators to leverage the effective self-policing achieved by some firms toward
broader enforcement efficiencies.
In this article, we theorize and test whether and how self-reporting might serve as an
indication of effective self-policing—as evidenced by improved regulatory compliance and
performance outcomes—that would create possibilities either for enhanced deterrence or the
economization of enforcement resources. To our knowledge, this is a novel undertaking. The
phenomenon of self-reporting is virtually absent from the literature on voluntary regulation.
Arlen (1994) and Arlen and Kraakman (1997) highlight the potential deterrence gains from
effective self-policing, but do not address how to identify effective self-policers in a way that
would enable agencies to target enforcement resources effectively and leverage these deterrence
gains in a complex regulatory scheme. Pfaff and Sanchirico (2000) suggest that self-reporting
can serve as a proxy for self-policing, but they neither theorize nor test whether this selfreporting conveys information about the effectiveness of self-policing. A few studies have
investigated how regulatory regimes can optimally leverage self-policing and self-reporting to
deter non-compliance and maximize aggregate social welfare (Friesen 2006; Innes 2001a). These
studies have not, however, considered whether or how self-reporting and self-policing might be
related within particular organizations. Understanding these relationships is critically important
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to the success of contemporary regulatory regimes that increasingly rely on multi-stakeholder
and mixed public-private strategies to achieve regulatory goals.

3. Empirical Context: The EPA Audit Policy
The EPA’s “Incentives for Self-Policing: Discovery, Correction and Prevention of
Violations” (Audit Policy) is the empirical setting for our research. On its face, the Audit Policy
program, launched in 1995, reduces or waives certain penalties for environmental violations that
are voluntarily disclosed to the government by regulated entities. We refer to these Audit Policy
disclosures interchangeably as “voluntary disclosures” or “self-reports.”

But the EPA’s

ambitions for the Audit Policy go beyond investigative leverage. Ultimately, the agency’s
objective is to encourage the adoption of “corporate compliance programs that are successful in
preventing violations [and] improving environmental performance” and helping to “enhance
protection of human health and the environment” (U.S. Environmental Protection Agency 1995:
66710-66712).
The program is designed to achieve this by conditioning penalty mitigation on disclosers’
representations of their past and future auditing practices. Like other self-reporting policies and
more traditional amnesty programs, the Audit Policy requires prompt and voluntary disclosure
and remediation of the violation.1 In addition, however, the Audit Policy requires that voluntary
disclosures arise from the “[s]ystematic discovery of the violation through an environmental

1

The Audit Policy provides the following conditions for full penalty mitigation and an EPA recommendation of no criminal
prosecution: “Systematic discovery of the violation through an environmental audit or the implementation of a compliance
management system; Voluntary discovery of the violation was not detected as a result of a legally required monitoring, sampling
or auditing procedure; Prompt disclosure in writing to EPA within 21 days of discovery…; Independent discovery and disclosure
before EPA or another regulator would likely have identified the violation through its own investigation or based on information
provided by a third-party; Correction and remediation within 60 calendar days, in most cases, from the date of discovery; Prevent
recurrence of the violation; [Violations of] specific terms of an administrative or judicial order or consent agreement [are
ineligible]; Cooperation by the disclosing entity is required” (U.S. Environmental Protection Agency 2009). The Audit Policy
does not, however, permit the agency to mitigate the “economic benefit” portion of the penalty, which recoups any financial
gains the company might have accrued by violating the law.
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audit or the implementation of a compliance management system” and requires self-reporters to
make assurances that they will “prevent recurrence of the violation” (U.S. Environmental
Protection Agency 2009). In these ways, the Audit Policy program explicitly links self-reporting
to self-policing.2
Our study investigates the assumptions that underlie this regulatory design. Specifically,
we examine (a) whether claims of self-policing made in connection with Audit Policy disclosures
prompt regulators to re-target their enforcement resources; and (b) whether self-reporters who
claim to be self-policing actually improve their regulatory compliance and performance
outcomes. This significantly extends existing research on the Audit Policy that has addressed the
types of violations that are voluntarily reported (Pfaff and Sanchirico 2004), the way the EPA’s
adoption of the Audit Policy has altered aggregate enforcement and compliance patterns
(Stafford 2004), and the factors that predict self-reporting (Short and Toffel 2008; Stretesky and
Gabriel 2005).

4. Hypotheses
Our empirical analysis investigates two questions. First, we examine whether regulators
use voluntary disclosures as a heuristic for targeting their enforcement resources. We suggest
that regulators will shift inspection resources away from self-reporting facilities in the belief that
these facilities are effectively policing themselves. Second, we test whether there is any warrant
for doing so. Specifically, we investigate whether facilities that “come clean” by self-reporting a

2

By 1999, the EPA had received Audit Policy disclosures of compliance violations pertaining to nearly 2000 facilities, and
while EPA was “encouraged by the growing trend in corporate-wide disclosures under our Audit Policy” (U.S. Environmental
Protection Agency 1999a: 2), it is important to consider this figure in the context of traditional enforcement mechanisms. For
example, in 1999, EPA and state environmental regulators conducted more than 500,000 compliance inspections, issued more
than 40,000 notices of violations, and filed nearly 12,000 formal administrative actions (Brown and Green 2001; U.S.
Environmental Protection Agency 2002).
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violation and commit to self-policing under the conditions of the Audit Policy actually “clean up
their act” more broadly and improve their overall regulatory compliance and performance. We
suggest here that, under certain conditions, voluntary disclosures can reliably indicate effective
self-policing practices.
4.1

Assessing the Regulator’s Response to Self-Reports

In this section, we investigate how regulators respond to self-reports. For a number of
reasons, we expect regulators to reduce their scrutiny of self-reporters. First, economic models
locate the efficiency gains of self-reporting in the fact that the enforcer need not investigate
companies that self-report violations (Friesen 2006; Kaplow and Shavell 1994). Even in the
regulatory context, where violations are often ongoing, regulators may be eager to reallocate
limited enforcement resources away from self-reporters and toward seemingly less cooperative
facilities, and/or to reduce agency costs by inspecting fewer facilities. Second, an extensive
literature on “responsive regulation” suggests that the kind of cooperative regulatory
relationships that underpin mixed public-private regulatory regimes are most likely to develop
when regulators engage in a “tit-for-tat” strategy, rewarding the cooperative behavior of
regulated facilities and using more punitive enforcement tools only when a regulated facility
defects (Ayres and Braithwaite 1992; Maxwell and Decker 2006; Scholz 1984). Inspection relief
is a key strategy for rewarding voluntary disclosers, building trust and responsibility, and
encouraging cooperative behavior. Indeed, many have argued that facilities are motivated to
self-report violations to regulators by the prospect that voluntary disclosures will demonstrate
cooperation and thus ease regulatory scrutiny (Helland 1998; Pfaff and Sanchirico 2000; Short
and Toffel 2008), and some have argued that regulators should credibly commit to easing
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regulatory scrutiny in order to incentivize self-regulatory behavior (Ayres and Braithwaite 1992;
Maxwell and Decker 2006).
A number of voluntary regulatory programs are designed with these arguments in mind.
Programs such as the U.S. Department of Agriculture’s Hazard Analysis and Critical Control
Point and the U.S. Occupational Safety and Health Administration’s Voluntary Protection
Program, for instance, expressly provide that the agency will decrease inspection activity at
participating firms (Chelius and Stark 1984).

Similarly, when the EPA launched its

Environmental Leadership Program, designed to strengthen corporations’ internal environmental
management practices, the agency “promise[d] not to perform routine inspections during the
pilot period” (Orts and Murray 1997: 20).
By contrast, the EPA has been unwilling to commit to providing such a quid pro quo for
Audit Policy disclosers. In fact, it has adopted the formal stance that “[a]uditing does not in any
way serve as a substitute for compliance activities, nor does it replace regulatory agency
inspections” (Johnson and Frey 2000: 4) and the agency’s Office of Enforcement Policy has
noted that, irrespective of self-policing efforts, “inspections play a major role in assuring quality
and lending credibility to self-monitoring programs” (Wasserman 1990: 17).3
Although the EPA acknowledges that the Audit Policy can only elicit voluntary
disclosures if it avoids the impression that self-reporting will attract increased regulatory
scrutiny,4 there are at least two reasons why the agency might not offer an explicit quid pro quo.

3
For example, the EPA noted in 1997 that “EPA’s longstanding policy is not to agree to limit its non-penalty enforcement
authorities as a provision of settlement or otherwise. While EPA may consider such a facility to be a lower inspection priority
than a facility that is not known to be auditing, whether and when to conduct an inspection does, and should, remain a matter of
Agency discretion” (U.S. Environmental Protection Agency 1997: vi). Also, the EPA’s Regional Council noted that, “While
EPA inspections of self-audited facilities will continue, to the extent that compliance performance is considered in setting
inspection priorities, facilities with a good compliance history may be subject to fewer inspections” (Johnson and Frey 2000: 5).
4

In a conversation with one of the authors, an EPA program administrator noted that “[t]he Agency has to avoid the perception
that it is picking on companies who participate in the Audit Policy” (Personal communication, March 16, 2004).
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First, structured interviews and informal conversations with EPA staff revealed that the agency
might want to maintain the flexibility to inspect particular disclosers as it sees fit, because many
regulators see voluntary disclosures as red flags indicating that self-reporting facilities might be
concealing bigger problems.5 Second, providing concrete benefits to regulated firms in exchange
for implementing compliance measures that are not required by law increases the risk that the
program will be subjected to heightened administrative procedural requirements and judicial
oversight.6 An enforcement program that is more coy about how it will target and reward
regulated entities can be promulgated through more informal procedures and shielded both from
public notice and comment and from judicial review (Lobel 2005; Sparrow 2000). We test
whether, despite its equivocation, the EPA does, in fact, grant inspection relief to voluntary
disclosers, generating greater opportunities for enforcement efficiencies, targeting leverage, and
regulatory cooperation.
4.2

Assessing Voluntary Disclosers’ Commitment to Self-Police

We next examine whether there is any warrant for granting enforcement relief to selfreporters, based on their subsequent compliance performance. We suggest that, in this context,
there is reason to believe that self-reporting will be a reliable indicator of effective firm-level
self-policing that would justify inspection relief, because the disclosure of legal violations is a

5
In a conversation with one of the authors, a former EPA attorney said that the agency tended to regard Audit Policy disclosures
as a “red flag” that warranted increased scrutiny (Personal communication, June 10, 2004). Our conversations with EPA
inspectors yielded mixed impressions: One inspector said she would be less suspicious of firms that self-disclosed, another
inspector that he would be more suspicious, noting, “if a facility makes a mistake in one area, it is probably making mistakes in
other areas” (Personal communication, October 12, 2007). See also discussion, infra, at p. 16.
6

The Federal Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia recently struck down OSHA’s Cooperative Compliance Program,
which sought to induce facilities to enter into agreements to police themselves in exchange for reduced scrutiny, stating that noncooperators would be higher priority targets for inspection. The decision was based, in part, on the fact that the agency sought to
use its inspection targeting practices to induce regulated facilities to adopt compliance programs that were not required by law.
The court argued that this approach altered the rights and interests of regulated parties and thus required the agency to vet the
policy through onerous Administrative Procedure Act notice and comment rulemaking procedures.
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risky and potentially costly act, especially for firms that cannot live up to the associated selfpolicing commitments.
Companies have gone to great lengths in recent years to communicate to regulators and
the broader public their commitment to police themselves by adopting codes of conduct,
establishing internal compliance offices, or joining industry- or agency-sponsored voluntary
programs (King, Lenox and Barnett 2002; King and Toffel 2009). It is far from clear, however,
whether any of these activities reliably identifies firms that have actually implemented effective
internal self-policing practices (Darnall and Carmin 2005). Outward indicators of self-regulation
typically impose minimal costs on the firms that adopt them (Darnall and Sides 2008; Lyon and
Maxwell 2007). Voluntary program design has focused on reducing costs to attract participants,
but less attention has been paid to the incentives necessary to promote meaningful corporate
harm reduction. Consequently, the fact that a firm adopts some form of voluntary regulation
reveals little about whether it is likely to follow through with the associated commitments.
Indeed, some have argued that self-regulation has been primarily a vehicle for self-promotion
(Bruno 1992; Krut and Gleckman 1998; Lyon and Maxwell forthcoming; Rhodes 2007) and
regulation avoidance (King and Lenox 2000; Maxwell, Lyon and Hackett 2000). Most selfregulatory programs have therefore been poor proxies for good compliance behavior.
However, voluntary regulation programs have been consistently associated with
meaningful self-policing under circumstances where they impose costs on those that fail to
implement their commitment to internally deterring harmful behavior. These costs have been
built into self-regulatory schemes in different ways; for instance, by requiring third-party
certifications of self-policing quality and denying certification to firms that fail to maintain
robust self-policing practices (Potoski and Prakash 2005; Toffel 2006; Weil 2005) and by
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imposing more stringent government regulation on those that fail to regulate themselves
effectively (Innes and Sam 2008; Maxwell, Lyon and Hackett 2000).
We argue that the Audit Policy similarly makes representations of self-policing more
credible by making them more costly, especially for those who would misrepresent their selfpolicing intentions or capacity. Unlike many other common indicators of self-policing, the
voluntary disclosure of regulatory violations is associated with three kinds of costs. First, there
are monetary costs associated with voluntary disclosures that are arguably greater than the
expected costs of hiding the violations. These include the cost of implementing and maintaining
the systematic internal monitoring process that is the policy’s prerequisite, the cost of
remediating the violation, and, often, the cost (albeit discounted) of fines imposed with certainty.
As Innes (2001b: 253) notes, “in practice, self-reporting firms have been subject to rather large
monetary sanctions.” Not every firm will be willing to incur these costs. Second, revealing
illegal actions has the potential to damage a firm’s reputation, both with the regulator and with
the public. As mentioned above, regulators sometimes view voluntary disclosures as “red flags,”
indicating more serious wrongdoing. And firms’ voluntary disclosures are publicly available, so
business partners, customers, and shareholders may become aware of wrongdoing that the firm
otherwise could have concealed. Finally, disclosing a violation to the regulator creates a risk of
greater future litigation costs. Because no federal audit privilege protects voluntary disclosers,
self-reports and the audit materials that support them can invite citizen suits that would impose
costs far beyond those directly associated with voluntary disclosure, especially where private
attorneys general suspect that the discloser has not cleaned up its act.
These risks are much greater for firms that would game the system than for firms that
wish to communicate, through their disclosures, a genuine commitment to self-policing. A
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facility that is truly a poor complier, and whose minimal compliance efforts are easily detectable
under regulatory scrutiny, is much less likely to disclose a violation because doing so risks
attracting attention and raising the suspicions of regulators, private attorneys general, and the
general public. Our interviews with regulators suggest that they are particularly wary of being
duped by self-reporters. One inspector reported that voluntary disclosures can raise a “red flag,”
but “[o]nly if they self-disclose and they’re not meeting the requirements of their self disclosure”
(Interview Transcript 4, 2009). Another noted that the agency may punish firms more harshly
when they misrepresent their self-policing efforts. “If we go to a place that has voluntary
programs and we find violations, we’re more likely to take enforcement. If we find violations,
it’s almost like they’re being dishonest in the voluntary program” (Interview Transcript 1, 2009).
In this way, self-reporting stands in stark contrast to the many self-regulation symbols that
merely provide a platform for self-promotion in that the voluntary disclosure of legal violations
is arguably “too costly to fake” (Camerer 1988: S186).
For these reasons, we hypothesize that, on average, companies that self-report violations
to the Audit Policy will make meaningful investments in self-policing to deter harmful conduct
by their employees.

To the extent that self-reporting facilities effectively implement their

commitments to self-police, their environmental compliance and environmental performance
should improve in a variety of ways (U.S. Environmental Protection Agency 2001). As Orts and
Murray (1997: 9) note: “First and foremost, environmental auditing informs a company of
potential risks of violations and accidents.

Better knowledge of these risks encourages

prevention.” We hypothesize that voluntary disclosers will both commit fewer environmental
regulatory violations and experience fewer environmental accidents than similarly situated, nondisclosing facilities.
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5. Data and Empirical Methods
5.1

Sample and Measures

We gathered data on facilities located across the United States that are subject to the U.S.
Clean Air Act (CAA), a statute that applies to a wide range of industries and activities that emit
air pollutants beyond regulatory thresholds. Our sample period of 1991 through 2003 reflects
data availability, as explained below.
Dependent variables. Our study employs three dependent variables. First, we measure
regulatory scrutiny as the annual number of CAA inspections to which each facility has been
subjected. We calculated this measure based on data from the Aerometric Information Retrieval
System (AIRS) database. 7
We use two dependent variables to assess the extent to which facilities are honoring their
commitment to self-police. Specifically, we examine regulatory inspection records as recorded
by a third-party, and abnormal releases of toxic chemicals that facilities are required to selfreport to the regulator. Relying on these different metrics enables us to triangulate our results,
and enhance the reliability of our empirical results (Campbell and Fiske 1959; Jick 1979).
A key facility-level metric that should be enhanced by effective self-policing is the
facility’s regulatory compliance record, a third-party assessment recorded by regulatory
inspectors. To measure environmental compliance, we created clean inspection, a dichotomous
variable that refers to a facility’s CAA regulatory inspection on a particular date. This variable is
coded “1” when the inspection resulted in no compliance violations (“clean”) and “0” when the

7

To avoid our results being driven by outliers, we recoded annual inspection tallies beyond 14, the 99.9th percentile, to 14 when
using this count as a dependent variable. We were even more conservative when using annual inspection tallies as a control
variable, taking the additional precaution against large values being overly influential by recoding values beyond 8, the 99th
percentile, to 8.
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inspector cited the facility for a violation (“dirty”). This distinction between whether or not
inspections resulted in violations has been used in other empirical analyses of regulatory
compliance (Gray and Scholz 1993; U.S. General Accounting Office 2001). We obtained data
on CAA inspections from 1991 through 2003 from the EPA’s AIRS/AIRS Facility Subsystem
(AFS) database.
Effective self-policing should also reduce the occurrences of abnormal operational events
such as accidental releases of pollutants to the environment. In contrast to regulatory inspections
which are recorded by a third party, certain facilities face regulatory requirements to self-report
accidental toxic chemicals releases to the EPA under penalty for misreporting or not reporting
incidents. We obtained data on these abnormal releases of toxic chemicals from the EPA’s
Toxic Release Inventory (TRI) database.

In this context, abnormal releases refer to toxic

chemical emissions that result from circumstances outside of routine operations; for example,
tank ruptures, vehicle accidents, or improperly maintained waste-pond berms (U.S.
Environmental Protection Agency 2007: 58).8 Interviews with state and federal regulators as
well as company environmental managers suggested that self-policing can result in improved
housekeeping and updated management plans, both of which can reduce the severity and
frequency of environmental releases associated with such abnormal or accidental events.9 For
example, ongoing auditing can help managers ensure that equipment is properly maintained and

8

Specifically, abnormal releases include all TRI chemicals “disposed or released directly into the environment or sent off-site for
recycling, energy recovery, treatment, or disposal during the reporting year due to any of the following events: (1) remedial
actions; (2) catastrophic events such as earthquakes, fires, or floods; or (3) abnormal events not associated with normal or routine
production processes” (U.S. Environmental Protection Agency 2007: 58). Our calls to New Jersey environmental regulators and
to the EPA confirmed that this definition was routinely provided to companies. Calls to several companies that had reported
abnormal releases confirmed that they used this definition in deciding what to report as abnormal releases.

9

For example, an EPA Regional TRI coordinator told us that “Internal audits would likely set up systems that could prevent or
mitigate abnormal releases. They could establish procedures that would prevent or mitigate one-time releases.” A regulator from
the New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection told us that internal environmental audits could reduce the frequency of
abnormal releases.
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that staff members adhere to training schedules, both of which can prevent breakdowns and
accidents.10 We calculated the annual number of abnormal releases from the subset of facilities
in our sample that were required to report TRI data.11
Independent variables. Our key explanatory variable is voluntarily disclosed, a
dichotomous variable coded “1” for a self-reporting facility in the years after it voluntarily
disclosed to the Audit Policy, and “0” beforehand. For non-disclosers, this variable is always
coded “0”. We compiled data on voluntary disclosures associated with the EPA Audit Policy
from the EPA Integrated Compliance Information System (ICIS) database, the EPA Audit Policy
Docket, and lists of facilities that responded to various EPA Compliance Incentive Programs.
The EPA provided these datasets in response to Freedom of Information Act requests.
Control variables. We obtained data for two measures of facility size. We gathered Dun
& Bradstreet data on annual facility employment from the National Establishment Time-Series
(NETS) Database. Because the number of abnormal releases might increase if production levels
increase, we also obtained data, from the TRI database, on facilities’ annual production ratio
values; that is, the ratio of a facility’s production level in the focal year to the prior year.12
Because TRI-reporting facilities report production ratios for each chemical each year, we
calculated the mean value for each facility-year. We took a conservative approach to avoid

10

A regulator at the New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection offered this example: “Above ground storage tanks
must have a berm around them that is large enough to contain the substance held in the container should it rupture. Making sure
that these are maintained can prevent further discharge into the environment” (Personal communication, March 20, 2008).
Similarly, an environmental manager at one of California’s largest manufacturing plants told us: “I definitely believe regular
audits are necessary to ensure not just regulatory compliance, but also the integrity of a facility’s environmental safeguard. The
purpose of the audits should be to identify potential mechanical or operating gaps in a system. Once identified, the facility can
develop countermeasures or remedial actions to address any findings” (Personal communication, March 20, 2008).

11

Facilities are required to report TRI data if they have at least 10 employees, operate in a targeted industry (such as
manufacturers, utilities, mining), and produce or use any of the listed chemicals in quantities greater than particular thresholds
(which range from 10 to 25,000 pounds) (U.S. Environmental Protection Agency 2007: 1, 6).

12

As we were unable to find data on actual production levels, we employ production ratios as a proxy.
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undue influence from outliers, top-coding values at the 99.9th percentile for the entire sample
distribution of mean production ratios.
We gathered data on several factors that might affect facilities’ compliance behaviors and
thus the likelihood of regulatory inspections resulting in violations. From the AIRS database, we
calculated each facility’s annual number of CAA inspections and violations. We use one-year
lagged values of these variables in our models.
Finally, we gathered data on several factors that might affect a facility’s annual
inspection frequency, considering both specific and general deterrence mechanisms (Cohen
2000).13 We considered two measures of specific deterrence. First, we calculated the number of
years since the facility was last inspected for compliance with the CAA, based on data from the
AIRS database. Second, we created a dummy variable coded “1” when the facility was cited
with at least one enforcement action and “0” otherwise, based on data from the EPA’s ICIS
database.14
We also obtained several measures of general deterrence. Every two years, the EPA
announces National Priority sectors to be targeted as nationwide enforcement priorities. We
coded National Priority sector as a dummy variable based on data from the EPA website.15
Second, we created a dummy variable to identify facilities that were EPA Compliance Incentive
Program targets based on data obtained from the agency via Freedom of Information Act
requests. These programs explicitly encourage facilities in particular EPA Regions or industries

13
According to deterrence theory, firms’ compliance behavior is influenced by both specific deterrence, “the fear engendered by
the prior experience of being inspected, warned or penalized themselves,” and general deterrence, “hearing about legal sanctions
against others” (Thornton, Gunningham and Kagan 2005: 263).
14

Fewer than 2% of facilities with any enforcement actions had more than a single one in a particular year. To avoid our results
being driven by these outliers, we created a dummy variable (rather than a count variable) to measure whether a facility had been
cited with any enforcement actions.

15

The EPA’s National Priority sectors can be found at http://www.epa.gov/compliance/data/planning/shortterm.html.
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or that conduct specific regulated activities to reexamine their compliance status regarding a
particular regulatory issue and to self-report and correct any violations discovered. Third, we
created two annual state-level variables pertaining to CAA enforcement based on AIRS data:
total CAA penalties assessed (in dollars) by environmental regulators and total number of CAA
regulated facilities.
5.2

Regulatory Scrutiny Model

We estimate the following model to assess the effect that self-reporting a violation and
committing to self-policing has on the number of regulatory inspections:
yi,t = f(DitXitSititttiit)

(1)

In this model, the unit of analysis is the facility-year. The dependent variable yi,t refers to
the annual number of CAA inspections to which facility i has been subjected in year t. Our key
explanatory variable is voluntarily disclosed (Di,t), which is coded as described earlier.
We control for many potential determinants of inspections in Xi,t. Several economic
models suggest that regulators can bolster the effectiveness of limited enforcement budgets by
targeting inspections based on facilities’ prior compliance records (Friesen 2003; Harrington
1988). In addition, the EPA notes that, given its limited resources, achieving compliance “is
dependent on effective targeting of the most significant public health and environmental risks”
(U.S. Environmental Protection Agency 1999b: 20).

This means targeting enforcement

resources at not only the most pressing problem areas, but also the firms most likely to be
creating problems, “taking into account…compliance/enforcement history” (U.S. Environmental
Protection Agency 1999b: 20). Indeed, EPA policy suggests that facilities found in violation are
often targeted for more frequent inspections in the near future (U.S. Environmental Protection
Agency 1990), a relationship supported by empirical evidence (Harrington 1988; Helland 1998).
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We thus include the annual number of CAA violations for which a facility was cited and a
dummy variable indicating whether the facility was subjected to an enforcement action, each
lagged one and two years.
Because regulators may attempt to ensure that they return to inspect facilities before a
certain time lag occurs, we include a series of dummy variables to denote the number of years
since the facility was last subjected to a CAA inspection. Specifically, we include three dummy
variables to denote 2, 3, and 4 and more years since a facility’s last CAA inspection.
We control for regulatory programs that might affect inspection rates by including
dummy variables that indicate whether, in a given year, a facility was targeted for heightened
inspector scrutiny via an EPA Compliance Incentive Program or an EPA National Priority sector.
We control for variation in enforcement strategies within states over time by including the log of
total penalties assessed by environmental regulators and the log of total regulated facilities in
each state-year (Si,t).
We include a full set of dummies (i,t) to control for the number of years before or after
the match year (matching is explained below). We also include a full set of year dummies (t) to
control for year-specific factors, such as changes in presidential administration, Congress, and
EPA leadership, that might affect inspection rates. We include conditional fixed effects (i) at
the facility level to control for all time-invariant factors, such as EPA Region and state regulatory
authorities, year of construction, industry, proximity to the inspection agency, and affluence of
the facility’s community, that might influence a facility’s inspection rate (Helland 1998).
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5.3

Regulatory Compliance Record Model

To evaluate the effect that self-reporting a violation and committing to self-policing has
on regulatory compliance records, we pursued the approach of other evaluations of selfregulatory programs (Gawande and Bohara 2005; King and Lenox 2000; Lenox 2006). We
estimate the following model using the individual inspection as our unit of analysis:
yi,d = fDi,dXi,ti,tt + i,tii,d)

(2)

In contrast to the preceding model, the unit of analysis in this model is a facility’s
regulatory inspection on a particular date. The dependent variable yi,d is our clean inspection
dichotomous variable that refers to facility i’s regulatory inspection on date d. The coefficient on
voluntarily disclosed (Di,d) is our estimate of the change in the probability that a facility’s
inspection was clean following its self-report and accompanying commitment to self-police
under the Audit Policy, compared to the probability for matched non-disclosing facilities over the
same time period.
We control for several factors that can affect a facility’s compliance rate. We include in
Xi,t the number of inspections and violations a facility experienced during each of the prior two
years because a facility’s recent regulatory experience can affect its subsequent compliance
(Gray and Deily 1996; Gray and Jones 1991; Gunningham, Thornton and Kagan 2005; Helland
1998; Magat and Viscusi 1990; Olson 1999; Shimshack and Ward 2005; Weil 1996).
Because the perceived likelihood of being inspected can also affect compliance behavior
(Laplante and Rilstone 1996; Shimshack and Ward 2005), we control for the predicted
probability of being inspected (Ii,t) (Earnhart 2004; Eckert 2004; Gray and Deily 1996; Laplante
and Rilstone 1996). We estimate a facility’s probability of being inspected at least once in a
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given year using the predicted value from the inspection model specified above as Equation (1)
but estimated using pooled logistic regression.16
We include facility-level conditional fixed effects (i) to control for all time-invariant
factors, such as the facility’s year of construction, EPA Region and state regulatory authorities,
industry, proximity to the regulatory inspector, and the political power and demographic
characteristics of its local community, that might affect a facility’s violation rate (Delmas and
Toffel 2008; Gawande and Bohara 2005; Gray and Deily 1996; Helland 1998; Lynch, Stretesky
and Burns 2004; Shimshack and Ward 2005). As with Equation (1), we also include as control
variables a full set of dummies indicating the number of years before or after the match year (i,t)
and a full set of dummies to denote years (t).
5.4

Abnormal Environmental Releases Model

To assess the effect that self-reporting a violation and committing to self-police have on
environmental performance, we estimate the following model:
yi,t = f(DitXiti,ttiit)

(3)

In this model, the unit of analysis is the facility-year. The dependent variable yi,t refers to
the annual number of abnormal releases by facility i in year t. Our key explanatory variable is
voluntarily disclosed (Di,t).
Because changes in facility size and production quantities may affect the number of
abnormal releases, Xi,t includes log employment and log production ratio.17 We also include a
full set of dummies (i,t) to control for the number of years before or after the match year. We

16

We use pooled logistic regression here to generate predicted probabilities because the conditional fixed-effects logit model
does not yield predicted probabilities that incorporate the fixed effects.
17

Our results were unchanged when we estimated models that omitted these two control variables.
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include a full set of year dummies (t) to control for year-specific factors, such as the emergence
of new technologies, that might affect the number of abnormal releases. We include facilitylevel conditional fixed effects (i) to control for all unobserved time-invariant factors, such as
industry, geographic location, EPA Region and state regulatory authorities, proximity to
inspection agencies, and political power of its community, that might influence a facility’s
abnormal releases.
5.5

Matched Sample

The three models described above employ a difference-in-differences approach whereby
we compare changes in the number of regulatory inspections, the probability that a regulatory
inspection yields no compliance violations, and the number of abnormal releases among selfreporting (voluntary disclosing) facilities relative to those of a matched set of control facilities.
This method permits each facility to have its own baseline level for each outcome. To ensure a
valid comparison, we developed a matched control group against which to estimate an average
treatment effect using a difference-in-differences specification with panel data, a robust
technique used in other recent program evaluations (Blundell and Costa Dias 2002; Galiani,
Gertler and Schargrodsky 2005; Greenaway, Gullstrand and Kneller 2005; Huttunen 2007; Qian
2007; Villalonga 2004).
The decision to disclose compliance violations to the Audit Policy is voluntary, yet the
identifying assumption of the difference-in-differences approach we employ is that nonparticipants and participants would have experienced the same regulatory stringency,
compliance, and pollution behavioral trends in the absence of program enrollment, after
controlling for observables.

Unable to identify suitable instrumental variables, we turn to

matching, the other main approach to generating unbiased estimates of a program’s effect when
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participation is voluntary (endogenous). Our objective is to compare disclosing facilities to a
matched set of non-disclosers that look “similar” to them in the years prior to voluntary
disclosure. We do this based on the logic that a matched group of disclosers and non-disclosers
that look similar before voluntary disclosure occurs would have continued to look similar in the
ensuing years had voluntary disclosure not occurred. In developing a matched sample, we seek
to replicate a randomized experiment that compares “treated” and “control” facilities that do not
differ systematically from each other at the time the treatment occurs (Shadish, Cook and
Campbell 2002), which in our case is when voluntary disclosure occurs. Relying on matched
samples has been shown to significantly reduce bias in program evaluation (Blundell and Costa
Dias 2000; Smith and Todd 2005).
To develop our matched sample, we implement case-control matching based on several
factors which empirical studies have shown to be associated with facilities’ decision to
voluntarily disclose to the Audit Policy (Short and Toffel 2008; Stafford 2007; Stretesky and
Gabriel 2005). We consider for each voluntary discloser its industry (3-digit SIC code) and its
annual inspections, violations, and enforcement actions during each of the two years before it
disclosed. We include as its matched controls those non-disclosing facilities that match it
exactly along all seven dimensions.18 We refer to the voluntary disclosure year as the “match
year” for this “matched group” of facilities. We repeat this process for all voluntary disclosers.
We omit from the matched sample any voluntary discloser for which no matches were available
and all non-disclosers that went unmatched.
18

Specifically, the matching criteria include each of the following facility-level measures: (1) industry as measured by its 3-digit
SIC code; (2) number of CAA inspections in the prior (calendar) year; (3) number of CAA inspections in the year two years
prior; (4) number of CAA violations in the prior year; (5) number of CAA violations in the year two years prior; (6) a dummy
coded “1” if the facility faced any enforcement actions in the prior year; and (7) a dummy coded “1” if the facility faced any
enforcement actions in the year two years prior. For self-disclosing facilities, we use the year a facility self-disclosed to the Audit
Policy as the year from which to calculate the one- and two-year lags. For non-disclosing facilities, we calculate these factors for
all years.
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Our matching process resulted in our discarding many facilities for which matches could
not be identified. This substantially increased the proportion of disclosing facilities (treatments)
in our matched sample because matching led us to discard many more potential controls than
treatments. Matching resulted in an overall matched sample of 19,986 facilities, including 688
that voluntarily disclosed violations. Our analysis includes each matched facility’s observations
starting two years before its match year through five years after the match year.
In our analysis, we focused on facilities’ initial disclosure and considered a facility to be
a treatment facility in that year and in all subsequent years. We believe this to be a reasonable
way to consider treatment in our context, since 70% of the facilities that voluntarily disclosed to
the Audit Policy did so only once and, of those that disclosed more than once, the vast majority
(approximately 90%) did so only twice, with repeat disclosures averaging only 1.4 years apart.
Although we match on the determinants of self-disclosing that have been identified in the
prior literature, include in our regressions specifications several factors that affect the outcome
variables, and rely on facility-level fixed effects to control for time-invariant unobservables, we
cannot rule out the possibility that time-variant unobservables might influence our results.
However, our models that predict organizational outcomes are associational, not causal: the
reductions in compliance violations and abnormal environmental releases are caused not by the
self-disclosures that we model, but rather by the unobserved self-policing (internal auditing) for
which we take the disclosures to be an indication. Unobservable differences should therefore not
generate biased estimates of the association between disclosures and these outcomes. In
contrast, our regulatory scrutiny model is a causal model that predicts that regulators will
respond directly to Audit Policy disclosures under the assumption that they indicate internal
auditing. Consequently, as with any evaluation that draws causal inferences based on difference-
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in-differences regression on a sample matched on observables, our regulatory scrutiny results
should be interpreted with the caveat of the identifying assumption that time-variant
unobservables are not correlated with both disclosing and regulatory scrutiny.

6. Results
Descriptive statistics are provided in Table 1. We report the results of our regressions
that predict outcomes recorded by the regulator (inspection frequency and clean inspections),
followed by the results of our regressions that predict self-reported outcomes (abnormal releases)
in Tables 2-4. All specifications include facility fixed effects, with standard errors calculated
using block bootstrap with 500 replications.19 Although we also report results from the entire
sample for comparison purposes, we rely on results from the matched sample as the basis of our
interpretation and inferences, noting that in most cases both samples yield similar coefficient
estimates and confidence intervals (see Table 5).
6.1 Regulatory Scrutiny
We employed conditional fixed-effects logistic regression to analyze whether the
probability of a facility experiencing any inspections in a given year declined after voluntarily
disclosing a violation and committing to self-policing. We employed conditional fixed-effects
negative binomial regression to estimate whether these facilities’ annual number of inspections
declined.

The results for both models are consistent and indicate that regulators granted

19

Bertrand, Duflo, and Mullainathan (2004) highlight the potential for serial correlation to lead to seriously underestimated
standard errors in difference-in-differences specifications. They find that calculating standard errors using block bootstrap
provides a reliable solution when the number of groups is large, as it is in our context.
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inspection holidays to facilities that voluntarily disclosed and committed to self-policing (Table
2).
The results of the conditional fixed-effects logistic model reported in Column 2 of Table
2 indicate that facilities that self-reported subsequently experienced a 26% decline in the
probability of facing any inspections compared to the matched controls (=-0.30; p<0.01;
OR=0.74). To put this result into context, this refers to a seven-percentage-point decrease in the
probability of an inspection from the 37% baseline to 30%.20
The negative binomial results reported in Column 4 of Table 2 indicate that after facilities
voluntarily disclosed, the annual number of inspections declined by 17% (=-0.19; p<0.01;
IRR=0.83). This effect corresponds to a decrease in the number of annual inspections during the
two-year period prior to the match year from the 0.50 baseline to 0.42 (calculated as IRR 
baseline rate, or 0.83  0.50). In other words, on average, 100 disclosing facilities would be
subjected to a total of 40 fewer inspections over a five-year period (calculated as a 0.08 decrease
in inspections per facility-year  100 facilities  5 years).
6.1.1. Robustness Tests
Our conditional fixed-effects logistic regression results were nearly identical when,
instead of using block bootstrap, we clustered standard errors by facility. Our conditional fixedeffects negative binomial regression results were nearly identical to results from our estimated
this model using a conditional fixed-effects Poisson regression with robust standard errors
clustered by facility.

20

The 37% figure refers to the mean of the dependent variable in this matched sample during the two years prior to the match
year (0.37). The 30% figure corresponds to the probability (p) is calculated based on odds () and odds ratio (OR) as follows.
First, convert the baseline probability of 0.37 to a baseline odds as =p/(1-p) = 0.37 / (1-0.37) = 0.5873. Second, multiply the
result by the odds ratio estimate as   OR = 0.5873  0.74 = 0.4346. Third, convert the result to a probability as  = p/(1-p) =
0.4346 = p(1-p). Thus p=0.30 or 30%.
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Our difference-in-differences approach relies on an identifying assumption that the trends
in outcomes (specifically, the difference in outcomes between the pre- and post-periods) among
discloser and non-discloser facilities would have been indistinguishable if discloser facilities had
not committed to self-policing through the Audit Policy’s voluntary disclosure vehicle. Although
this assumption cannot be tested, it is more plausible if the two groups had indistinguishable
trends during the pre-period. A t-test confirmed that our results were not confounded by preexisting differences in trends between facilities that were about to disclose and matched nondisclosing facilities.21
To assess the risk that mean reversion might be driving our results, we estimated an
annual treatment effects models. Specifically, we replaced the single voluntarily disclosed
variable (which estimated the average treatment effect) with a series of dummy variables
indicating the first year after voluntary disclosure, the second year after voluntary disclosure, and
so on. If our main results were driven by mean reversion, we would expect only the first (or
perhaps the first two) of these annual treatment effects to be negative and large. The results of
these annual treatment effect models, reported in Table A1 in the Appendix, provide no evidence
that our results were driven largely by changes in inspector behavior during the first postdisclosure year. Indeed, the results of both of these models indicate that the inspectors’ scrutiny
declined over time, suggesting that mean reversion is unlikely to be driving our results.
To assess the extent to which our analysis might be biased by substantive differences in
observables during the pre-match period between the matched treatment and control facilities,
we calculated standardized differences (Rosenbaum and Rubin 1985) for all of the covariates,

21
We compared self-disclosers’ and non-disclosers’ inspection trends during the two years prior to the match year. We
calculated the difference between the number of inspections each facility experienced in the match (disclosure) year and the
number it experienced two years prior. A t-test indicated that the two groups had indistinguishable pre-trends (p=0.96).
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regardless of whether or not they were part of the matching regime.22 The absolute values of the
standardized differences were below the 20% threshold indicated by Rosenbaum and Rubin
(1985) for five of the seven covariates. The two covariates whose standardized differences
exceeded the 20% threshold were the dichotomous variables Compliance Incentive Program
target and National Priority sector. To assess the extent to which these imbalances might be
biasing our results, we split the matched sample into two subsamples: (a) those treatment and
control facilities that had been Compliance Incentive Program targets and/or in National Priority
sectors during this pre-match period and (b) those treatment and control facilities that had been
neither Compliance Incentive Program targets nor in National Priority sectors during this prematch period. We re-estimated the model on these two subsamples, the results of which
continued to indicate statistically significant reductions in regulatory scrutiny (= -0.12, p=0.086
for subsample (a); = -0.24, p<0.01 for subsample (b)). The substantial overlap of the confidence
intervals for these two estimates23 implies they are statistically indistinguishable, indicating little
cause for concern that differences in observables are biasing our main results.
6.2

Regulatory Compliance Records

We employ conditional fixed-effects logistic regression to estimate the probability that a
regulatory inspection is “clean”; that is, it reveals no violations. Recall that this model includes a
generated regressor because the probability of inspection is a predicted value from a pooled logit

22

We calculated standardized differences pursuant to Rosenbaum and Rubin (1985) as follows:
X Tm  X Cm
Standardized Difference  X   100 
VTr ( X )  VCr ( X )
2

where X Tm and X Cm represent the sample means of covariate X for the matched treatment facilities and the matched control
facilities, respectively, during the two years prior to the match (treatment) year. VTr ( X ) and VCr (X ) represent the variance of
covariate X for the entire reservoir of treatment and control facilities (facilities in the entire sampling frame regardless of whether
or not they were in the matched sample).
23
The 95% confidence interval was (-0.254, 0.017) for sample (a) and (-0.351, -0.125) for subsample (b).
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model. Thus, the block bootstrap standard errors we report here are calculated as a result of a
sequential two-step estimation process (Cameron and Trivedi 2005: 200; Cameron and Trivedi
2009: 427) that we implemented as follows. All observations pertaining to a randomly drawn
subsample of facilities were used to estimate the pooled logit regression that predicts the
probability of an inspection occurring that year. Predicted values generated for this subsample
were used as a generated regressor in the conditional fixed-effects logistic regression that
estimates clean inspections. This procedure was repeated 500 times to generate our results.
The results indicate that self-reporting a violation and concomitantly committing to selfpolicing is associated with improved compliance records. As indicated in Column 2 of Table 3,
inspections conducted during the five years subsequent to voluntary disclosure were more than
twice as likely as pre-disclosure inspections to be “clean” (=0.73; p=0.075; OR=2.08),
compared to the matched controls over the same time period (Table 3). This effect corresponds
to a 7.4-percentage-point increase in the probability of a clean inspection from the 84.6%
baseline to 92.0%.24
6.2.1. Robustness Tests
Clustering standard errors by facility yielded results nearly identical to those obtained via
block bootstrapping, resulting in a more precise estimate (clustered SE=0.38 and p=0.054,
compared to block bootstrap SE=0.41 and p=0.075). A t-test confirmed that our results were not
confounded by voluntary disclosers having faster improvement trends during the pre-disclosure

24

The 84.6% baseline is the mean of the dependent variable in this matched sample during the two years prior to the match year
(0.846). The 92.0% figure refers to the probability (p) calculated based on odds () and odds ratio (OR) as follows. First, convert
the baseline probability of 0.846 to a baseline odds as =p/(1-p) = 0.846 / (1-0.846) = 5.4935. Second, multiply the result by the
odds ratio estimate as   OR = 5.4935  2.08= 11.4265. Third, convert the result to a probability as  = p/(1-p) = 11.4265 =
p(1-p). Thus p=11.4265 /12.4265 = 0.9195 or 92.0 %.
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period than the matched non-disclosers.25
Although including predicted probability of inspection subjects this model to the
possibility of introducing autocorrelation, our results and some additional analysis lead us to
believe this is unlikely to be driving our results. First, we note that Table 3 (Column 2) reports
the coefficient on predicted probability of inspection to be 0.090 (odds ratio=1.09), a magnitude
close to zero and not statistically significant. Also, a one-standard-deviation change in predicted
probability of inspection is associated with a very minor change in the odds of a clean inspection
of a magnitude very close to a null effect of 1.0.26 Second, we calculated autocorrelation to
equal -0.03, a value close to zero.

This low value provides no evidence to suspect that

autocorrelation is significantly influencing our results. Third, re-estimating the model omitting
predicted probability of inspection yielded a coefficient on our focal variable voluntarily
disclosed that was similar in magnitude and significance to our primary model. Fourth, we reestimated the model using Arellano-Bond general methods of moments (GMM) dynamic panel
data estimation, which is robust to autocorrelation, to estimate both our primary specification
(including predicted probability of inspection) and the latter alternative model that omitted
predicted probability of inspection.

Each of these alternative models yielded positive,

statistically significant coefficients on voluntarily disclosed, which supports our primary results.
These additional analyses lead us to believe our results are robust to potential autocorrelation.
To assess the robustness of our results to estimation techniques, we re-estimated the
model employing a two-stage panel data instrumental variables model to simultaneously estimate
25

We compared self-disclosers’ and non-disclosers’ trends of abnormal releases during the two years prior to the match year.
For each facility, we calculated the difference between the proportion of inspections that were “clean” in the match (disclosure)
year and two years prior. A t-test provided no evidence that the eventual self-disclosers were improving compliance more
quickly than the matched non-disclosers (p=0.96).

26

This “very minor change” is calculated as exp( * SD) = exp(0.09 * 0.15) = 1.01, using the predicted probability of inspections
standard deviation of 0.15 per Panel B of Table 1.
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the “probability of an inspection” as a first stage and “clean inspection” model as a second stage.
This model, designed to accommodate continuous rather than our dichotomous variables, also
yielded a positive, statistically significant coefficient on voluntarily disclosed.
Another potential concern with our model is that our results might be confounded by
regression to the mean. Given our matching technique, our treatment and control facilities share
the same underlying compliance violation rate in the years prior to the match (disclosure). If our
treatment facilities experienced a random negative shock of experiencing an additional violation
in a given year and this led them to disclose the violation to the Audit Policy, then their apparent
improvement in compliance in the subsequent year could be interpreted as merely regressing
back to the mean. In contrast to this scenario, the results of an alternative model with annual
treatment effects, reported in Table A2 in the Appendix, indicate that disclosers show
significantly increased likelihood of clean inspections during later post-disclosure years, which
suggests that mean reversion is unlikely to be driving our results.
As above, we assessed the extent to which our analysis might be biased by substantive
differences in observables during the pre-match period between the matched treatment and
control facilities by calculating standardized differences for all covariates in the model. For only
one of the covariates, lagged inspections, did the absolute value of the standardized difference
exceed the 20% threshold. To test whether this imbalance might be biasing our regression
results, we trimmed the matched sample to include only matched treatments and controls with
annual inspection rates during the two-year period prior to the match year that were within the
95th percentile of the common support; that is, 0, 1, or 2 annual inspections the prior year. The
absolute value of the standardized differences for all covariates in this trimmed sample fell
within than the 20% threshold. The results of our regulatory compliance model when estimated
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for this trimmed sample continued to indicate a statistically significant increase (=0.83, p=0.03,
OR=2.30) in the probability of a clean inspection following disclosure, with a coefficient
magnitude very similar our main results. The substantial overlap of the 95% confidence intervals
on voluntarily disclosed between this estimate (0.07, 1.60) and that of our main result (-0.01,
1.48) implies that the two estimates are statistically indistinguishable, indicating little cause for
concern that differences in observables are biasing our main results.
In light of our earlier finding that regulators reduced the frequency with which they
inspected self-disclosing facilities, it is possible that when inspectors return to these facilities
they might inspect less intensively, which could contribute to our finding a reduction in
compliance violations among self-disclosers. However, our interviews with regulatory inspectors
provide evidence against a systematic bias in favor of (or against) facilities that disclosed to the
Audit Policy. Some inspectors reported that they did not know whether the facilities they
inspected were voluntary disclosers and those inspectors who did know said that this knowledge
had no impact on the way they conducted their inspections. As one inspector noted, “We look at
everything and it makes no difference one way or the other” (Interview Transcript 5, 2009). An
inspector with relatively broad experience inspecting voluntary disclosing facilities stated his
belief that self-policing produced mixed results that necessitated ongoing scrutiny. Discussing
the quality of internal compliance auditing conducted by voluntary disclosing facilities, he said:
“It really varies. I’ve seen companies that took it to heart, but it didn’t affect how we inspect
them, and I’ve seen companies where they say ‘We’re part of all these programs,’ and found a
lot of violations” (Interview Transcript 1, 2009). In addition, EPA takes structural precautions
against inspection bias, strictly segregating its office for voluntary programs from its field
inspection operations to avoid any actual or apparent conflict of interest. Thus, although we
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cannot rule out the possibility that some inspectors might inspect self-disclosers less intensely
and we highlight this issue to provide context when interpreting our results, our qualitative
evidence suggests that such a reduction in intensity is neither prevalent nor systematic.

6.3

Abnormal Environmental Releases

We employ conditional fixed-effects negative binomial regression to estimate whether
facilities’ annual number of abnormal releases declined after voluntarily disclosing and
committing to self-policing under the Audit Policy. The results based on the matched sample
(Column 2 of Table 4) indicate that the expected annual number of abnormal releases declined
by 20% (=-0.22; p<0.01; IRR=0.80) after facilities voluntarily disclosed to the Audit Policy,
compared to the matched non-disclosers over the same time period. This corresponds to a
decline in abnormal releases per year from the 1.2 baseline to 0.96.27 This 0.24 decline per
facility-year is equivalent to 120 fewer abnormal releases amongst 100 disclosing facilities over
a five-year period (calculated as 0.24 releases per facility-year  100 facilities  5 years).
6.3.1. Robustness Tests
Our results were very similar when the model was re-estimated using conditional fixed
effects Poisson regression with robust standard errors clustered by facility. In addition, a t-test
indicated that the facilities that were about to voluntarily disclose to the Audit Policy and the
matched non-disclosing facilities had indistinguishable trends in the number of abnormal

27

The 1.2 baseline is the matched sample average during the two years prior to the match year. The 0.96 figure is calculated as
IRR  baseline rate, or 0.80  1.2.
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releases during the pre-match period, providing no evidence that this factor confounded our
results.28
To assess the potential concern that our results might be driven by regression to the mean,
we estimated an annual treatment effects model. The results, reported in Table A3 in the
Appendix, indicate that reductions in abnormal releases during the first post-disclosure year were
statistically indistinguishable from reductions in subsequent years, which suggests that mean
reversion is unlikely to be driving our results.
We also assessed the extent to which our analysis might be biased by substantive
differences in observables during the pre-match period. In this estimation sample, the absolute
value of the standardized difference for all covariates fell within the 20% threshold, indicating
little cause for concern that differences in observables are biasing our main results (Rosenbaum
and Rubin 1985).

7. Conclusion
Our results provide evidence that self-reporting can reliably indicate effectively
implemented self-policing and that regulators are, in fact, using self-reporting to identify firms
that are meaningfully monitoring their own operations. Specifically, we find that regulators
rewarded voluntary disclosers with inspection relief, suggesting that integrating self-reporting
into regulatory design can help regulators economize government enforcement resources and
develop cooperative relationships with committed self-policers.

28

We also demonstrate that

Specifically, we calculated the difference between the number of abnormal releases each facility experienced in the match
(disclosure) year and the number it experienced in the two prior years. A t-test indicated that self-disclosers and non-disclosers
had indistinguishable pre-trends (p=0.37). We employed this “difference” metric rather than a “percent changes” metric because
a large proportion of our sample had no abnormal releases in the baseline year and their “percent change” from that period is thus
undefined.
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facilities that voluntarily disclosed a violation and committed to self-police under the Audit
Policy improved their environmental performance by (1) improving their environmental
compliance records, being cited by regulators for fewer violations than similarly situated nondisclosers, and (2) reducing their accidental releases of toxic chemicals to the environment. We
attribute these results to the design of the Audit Policy, which explicitly links self-reporting to
self-policing.
Our findings contribute in four important ways to a literature that some have criticized for
being “noncommittal on the question of whether voluntary disclosure policies are worthwhile
complements to conventional enforcement strategies” (Murphy and Stranlund 2008: 261). First,
we find evidence that suggests that regulators do, in fact, use self-reporting as a heuristic for
targeting enforcement resources. Consistent with studies that find reduced regulatory scrutiny
for firms that improve toxic pollution levels (Decker 2005) or self-report Resource Conservation
and Recovery Act violations (Stafford 2007), we show that the EPA grants inspection relief to
voluntary disclosers. It is important to note that, while they inspect self-reporters at reduced
rates, regulators do continue to monitor these facilities. This suggests an attempt on the part of
the agency to blend responsive and deterrence-based enforcement tools.
Second, we demonstrate that facilities that committed to self-police as a part of their
voluntary disclosures to the Audit Policy did, in fact, internally deter harmful behavior by their
employees. These findings support Arlen’s (1994) and Arlen and Kraakman’s (1997) argument
that internal self-policing can contribute to overall deterrence in a given enforcement regime and
confirm that self-policing can provide enforcement benefits above and beyond those achieved
through mere self-reporting.
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Third, we demonstrate that, when self-reports of legal violations are conditioned on a
commitment to self-police, they can provide a means for regulators to identify facilities that, on
average, are deterring harmful behavior on the part of their employees. In a mixed regulatory
enforcement scheme, regulators must have a means of recognizing effective self-policers in order
to leverage the deterrent effects achieved at these facilities and reallocate enforcement resources
toward facilities that are not deterring harmful conduct internally. Although valid concerns have
been raised that companies might self-report violations strategically to game the system (Pfaff
and Sanchirico 2000), our results imply that this concern may be exaggerated, at least within a
disclosure scheme designed to impose costly risks on gamers.
Finally, and more broadly, our results suggest the importance of addressing signaling
issues more explicitly in regulatory design. To date, the literature on self-policing has focused
almost exclusively on incentives, discussing how regulators should calibrate rewards and
penalties to induce firms to police themselves (Arlen and Kraakman 1997; Coglianese and Nash
2001; Maxwell and Decker 2006; Pfaff and Sanchirico 2000). Agencies, too, have focused on
incentives in designing voluntary programs, going to great lengths to reduce the costs29 and
emphasize the benefits30 of self-policing.

Unfortunately, in their efforts to incentivize

participation, regulators often strip self-regulatory commitments of any informational value they

29

For example, the EPA promotes its WasteWise program as “free, voluntary, flexible” and makes clear that “[t]he amount of
time and money you invest is up to you! You are free to set goals that are the most feasible and cost-effective for your
organization,” which includes the possibility of zero investment beyond completing the brief online registration form (U.S.
Environmental Protection Agency, EPA WasteWise Program Overview, http://www.epa.gov/wastewise/about/overview.htm
(updated December 18, 2007; accessed December 31, 2007)).
30

The EPA, for instance, provides participants in its Performance Track program with “green marketing support,” irrespective of
the results they ultimately achieve. This includes, according to a Congressional Committee, “motivational posters; camera-ready
advertisement “slicks”; press release templates; draft congratulatory letters to be signed by State Governors and other public
officials; ‘tips’ for communicating with employees, the public, and the media about Performance Track; video and Powerpoint
presentations; vehicle signs; flags; and event/conference planning” (Letter from the Hon. Albert R. Wynn, Chairman, House
Subcommittee on Environment and Hazardous Materials, and the Hon. Bart Stupak, Chairman, House Subcommittee on
Oversight and Investigations, to the Hon. Stephen L. Johnson, Adm’r, EPA (April 13, 2007)).
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might have. Regulators can enhance overall deterrence only if they can identify accurately
which facilities are policing themselves effectively and can target enforcement resources
accordingly. Legal scholarship has begun to explore ways to develop more finely grained
sorting and targeting systems along these lines. For instance, Raskolnikov (2009) has proposed a
tax compliance system that would identify cooperative and normatively motivated taxpayers by
allowing them to opt into an enforcement regime with terms that would be too costly for gamers
to accept. Our findings suggest that self-reporting coupled with a commitment to self-police can
serve as a valuable starting point for thinking about how to sort regulated firms by their
compliance capacities and motivations.
Our findings raise a number of interesting questions for future research. Although our
study suggests the possibility of enforcement efficiencies, it does not account for the costs of
self-policing or the nature of enforcement efficiencies achieved. A number of studies have
raised concerns about the high costs and minimal benefits of internal compliance programs
(Krawiec 2003; Langevoort 2002).

We demonstrate here that self-policing can have real

deterrence benefits, but future research is necessary to determine whether they are worth the cost
or whether similar deterrence levels could be achieved at lower cost through government
enforcement. It is also important to determine how enforcement resources shifted away from
voluntary disclosers are being reallocated and whether self-policing is contributing to enhanced
overall deterrence levels or to reduced enforcement costs.
Future research could seek to overcome the data limitations that prevented us from
differentiating the severity of compliance violations that were deterred and calculating the
attendant avoided social costs. Future studies should also investigate whether our findings hold
up in different regulatory and organizational contexts. It may be that voluntary disclosure has a
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stronger signaling value in some settings than in others. It would also be valuable to determine
whether the signaling value of self-reporting is contingent on a program design that ties it
explicitly to a commitment to self-police. Finally, future research could explore other ancillary
benefits of voluntary disclosure.

For example, prior research has found that voluntarily

disclosing environmental liabilities can bolster the credibility of other information such firms
release, which reduces their cost of capital and attenuates negative shocks to stock prices when
they release bad news (Blacconiere and Patten 1994; Cormier and Magnan 2007). Researchers
could investigate whether such benefits also accrue to firms that voluntarily disclose regulatory
compliance violations.
With regulators continuing to explore alternative approaches to increasing compliance at
lower cost, further empirical research is needed to examine the efficacy and efficiency of mixed
regulatory schemes that combine self-regulation with government enforcement. Regulators
eager to engage regulated entities in self-regulation must balance competing needs to design
programs that will attract participants, withstand legal and procedural challenges, and effectively
bolster compliance. Our results suggest that combining self-reporting with a commitment to
self-police can be a valuable tool for helping to achieve this balance.
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TABLE 1
SUMMARY STATISTICS
PANEL A. Sample for inspection analysis in Table 2

a

Annual number of inspections
Voluntarily disclosed (dummy)
Years since prior inspection b
Number of violations 1 year ago c
Any enforcement actions 1 year ago (dummy)
Compliance Incentive Program target (dummy)
National Priority sector (dummy)
Log total penalties in the state-year
Log number of regulated facilities in the state-year

Entire sample

Matched sample

N=367,776 facility-years

N=94,270 facility-years

Mean

SD

Min

Max

Mean

SD

Min

Max

0.76
0.01
1.94
0.03
0.01
0.03
0.12
11.86
7.25

1.01
0.08
1.18
0.18
0.10
0.16
0.32
4.47
0.73

0
0
1
0
0
0
0
0
1.61

14
1
4
3
1
1
1
17.56
8.29

0.64
0.02
2.08
0.02
0.01
0.05
0.16
12.44
7.27

0.79
0.14
1.24
0.15
0.11
0.22
0.37
4.11
0.71

0
0
1
0
0
0
0
0
1.61

14
1
4
1
1
1
1
17.56
8.29

PANEL B. Sample for compliance analysis in Table 3

Inspection is “clean” (no violations) (dummy)
Voluntarily disclosed (dummy)
Probability of an inspection this year (predicted)
Number of inspections 1 year ago c
Number of violations 1 year ago c

Mean
0.85
0.02
0.67
2.24
0.25

Entire sample
N= 68,411 inspections
SD
Min
0.35
0
0.14
0
0.13
0.21
2.42
0
0.60
0

Max
1
1
0.93
8
3

Matched sample
N=4,174 inspections
Mean
SD
Min
0.79
0.41
0
0.08
0.27
0
0.61
0.15
0.13
1.40
1.84
0
0.23
0.57
0

Max
1
1
0.89
8
3

PANEL C. Sample for abnormal environmental releases analysis in Table 4

a

Number of abnormal releases
Voluntarily disclosed (dummy)
Log production ratio c
Log employment

Entire sample
N=105,092 facility-years
Mean
SD
Min
Max
1.70
3.17
0
17
0.02
0.13
0
1
0.71
0.22
0
1.79
3.78
2.46
0
10.11

Mean
2.22
0.04
0.69
3.67

Matched sample
N=30,919 facility-years
SD
Min
Max
3.53
0
17
0.19
0
1
0.22
0
1.79
2.34
0
9.90

Note. In all panels, observations span 1993-2003. Within the matched sample, observations extend from 2 years prior to 5 years after each facility’s match year.
a
top-coded at 99.9th percentile
b
top-coded at 4 per year
c
top-coded at 99th percentile
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TABLE 2

Self-policing is associated with fewer inspections and lower probability of being inspected
Estimation technique:
Dependent variable:

Voluntarily disclosed
2 years since last inspection
3 years since last inspection
4 or more years since last inspection
Number of violations 1 year ago
Number of violations 2 years ago
Any enforcement actions 1 year ago
Any enforcement actions 2 years ago
Compliance Incentive Program target
National Priority sector
Log total CAA penalties in the state-year

Conditional fixed-effects logistic regression

Conditional fixed-effects negative binomial regression

Any annual inspections

Number of annual inspections

(1)
Entire sample
Coefficients
Odds ratio

(2)
Matched sample
Coefficients
Odds ratio

(3)
Entire sample
Coefficients Incident rate
ratios

(4)
Matched sample
Coefficients Incident rate
ratios

-0.256**
[0.082]
0.170**
[0.011]
0.282**
[0.016]
0.654**
[0.015]
0.225**
[0.028]
0.071**
[0.027]
-0.079+
[0.046]
-0.150**
[0.046]
0.045
[0.027]
0.014
[0.018]
0.021**
[0.003]
1.675**
[0.044]
Included

-0.303**
[0.114]
0.372**
[0.023]
0.537**
[0.031]
1.177**
[0.032]
0.157*
[0.071]
0.035
[0.067]
-0.142
[0.087]
-0.185+
[0.099]
0.049
[0.045]
0.282**
[0.034]
0.013
[0.008]
1.390**
[0.102]
Included
Included

-0.053
[0.037]
0.032**
[0.005]
0.064**
[0.009]
0.256**
[0.011]
0.058**
[0.010]
0.005
[0.011]
-0.004
[0.020]
-0.016
[0.022]
0.022+
[0.013]
0.031**
[0.009]
0.002
[0.002]
0.791**
[0.021]
Included

-0.185**
[0.052]
0.126**
[0.011]
0.231**
[0.018]
0.618**
[0.018]
0.026
[0.027]
-0.010
[0.027]
0.002
[0.035]
-0.024
[0.046]
0.049*
[0.020]
0.102**
[0.020]
-0.012**
[0.004]
0.623**
[0.042]
Included
Included

0.77
1.19
1.33
1.92
1.25
1.07
0.92
0.86
1.05
1.01
1.02

0.74
1.45
1.71
3.25
1.17
1.04
0.87
0.83
1.05
1.33
1.01

0.95
1.03
1.07
1.29
1.06
1.01
1.00
0.98
1.02
1.03
1.002

0.83
1.13
1.26
1.86
1.03
0.99
1.00
0.98
1.05
1.11
0.99

Log number of CAA-regulated
5.34
4.02
2.21
1.87
facilities in the state-year
Facility-level conditional fixed effects
Fixed effects for t years
before/after match year
Year fixed effects (1994-2003)
Included
Included
Included
Observations
328,032
82,287
367,776
94,270
Facilities
42,270
13,673
48,972
16,078
Wald chi-squared
5688.7**
2782.4**
4616.5**
4733.2**
Note. Block bootstrap standard errors in brackets (500 replications). Unit of analysis is the facility-year. Models 2 and 4 are estimated on the matched sample and include
matched facilities’ observations starting 2 years prior to their match year through 5 years after the match year. The conditional fixed-effects logistic regressions (Models 1 and 2)
omit facilities for which annual inspection rates are either always positive or always zero throughout the sample period. The conditional fixed-effects negative binomial regressions
(Models 3 and 4) omit facilities that have identical annual inspection rates throughout the sample period.
+ p<0.10; * p<0.05; ** p<0.01.
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TABLE 3

Self-policing is associated with fewer compliance violations

Conditional fixed-effects logistic regression
Dependent variable: Clean inspection
(1)
Entire sample
Coefficients Odds ratio
Voluntarily disclosed
Probability of an inspection this year (predicted)
Number of inspections 1 year ago
Number of inspections 2 years ago
Number of violations 1 year ago
Number of violations 2 years ago
Facility-level conditional fixed-effects
Year fixed effects (1994-2003)
Fixed effects for t years before/after match year
Observations (Inspections)
Facilities
Wald Chi squared

0.730+
[0.376]
0.107
[0.387]
-0.194**
[0.043]
-0.134**
[0.046]
1.089**
[0.123]
1.129**
[0.120]
Included
Included
11,326
1,772
257.0***

2.0757
1.1124
.82383
.8749
2.9709
3.09395

(2)
Matched sample
Coefficients Odds ratio
0.733+
[0.412]
0.090
[0.598]
-0.200**
[0.076]
-0.134
[0.083]
1.182**
[0.224]
1.194**
[0.229]
Included
Included
Included a
4,174
713
154.5***

2.08
1.09
0.82
0.87
3.26
3.30

Note. Block bootstrap standard errors in brackets (500 replications). Unit of analysis is a facility’s
inspection. The dependent variable is coded “1” when an inspection resulted in no cited violations and
“0” when at least one violation was cited. Model 2 is estimated on the matched sample and includes
facilities’ observations spanning 2 years prior to the match year through 5 years after the match year. The
conditional fixed-effects logistic regression models omit facilities with no variation in the dependent
variable throughout the sample period, including facilities in our sample that maintained uniform (perfect)
compliance records during our sample period. Predicted probability of an inspection this year is the
predicted value from the inspection model specified in Equation (1) estimated with pooled logistic
regression.
+ p<0.10; * p<0.05; ** p<0.01.
a
To overcome collinearity with the year fixed effects that prevented the model from converging, we
merged the dichotomous dummy variables 4 years after match year and 5 years after match year into a
single dichotomous variable.

52

TABLE 4
Self-policing is associated with fewer abnormal environmental releases
Conditional fixed-effects negative binomial regression
Dependent variable: Number of abnormal releases
(1)
(2)
Entire sample
Matched sample
Coefficients Incident rate Coefficients Incident rate
ratio
ratio
Voluntarily disclosed
Log production ratio
Log employment
Facility-level conditional fixed-effects
Year fixed effects (1994-2003)
Fixed effects for t years before/after match year
Observations
Facilities
Model Wald Chi-squared

-0.169**
[0.051]
0.039+
[0.022]
-0.032**
[0.008]
Included
Included
105,092
13,082
12945.0**

0.84
1.04
0.97

-0.223**
[0.063]
0.011
[0.036]
0.003
[0.014]
Included
Included
Included
30,919
5,582
4765.7**

0.80
1.01
1.00

Note. Block bootstrap standard errors in brackets (500 replications). The unit of analysis is the facilityyear. These models also include a dummy variable denoting when a missing employment value was
recoded to zero. These models are estimated only on those facilities that reported data to the EPA’s Toxic
Release Inventory. Model 2 is estimated on the matched sample and includes matched facilities’
observations starting 2 years prior to their match year through 5 years after the match year. The
conditional fixed-effects negative binomial regression models omit facilities that have identical annual
abnormal release rates throughout the sample period.
+ p<0.10; * p<0.05; ** p<0.01.
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Table 5. Comparing results: Entire sample to matched sample
Voluntarily disclosed coefficients, with 95% confidence intervals in brackets
Dependent
variable:
Entire sample

Matched sample

Any annual inspections
Table 2, Model 1

Number of annual
inspections
Table 2, Model 3

Table 3, Model 1

Number of
abnormal releases
Table 2, Model 1

-0.26
[-0.42, -0.10]

-0.05
[-0.13, 0.02]

0.73
[-0.01, 1.47]

-0.17
[-0.27, 0.07]

Table 2, Model 2

Table 2, Model 4

Table 3, Model 2

Table 4, Model 2

-0.30
[-0.53, -0.08]

-0.18
[-0.29, -0.08]

0.73
[-0.07,1.54]

-0.22
[-0.35, -0.10]
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Clean inspection

APPENDIX

Table A1. Inspection frequency annual treatment effect models
Estimation technique:
Dependent variable:

(1)
Conditional fixed-effects
logistic regression
Any annual inspections
Matched sample
Coefficients
Odds ratio

T1

1st year after voluntarily disclosed

T2

2nd year after voluntarily disclosed

T3

3rd year after voluntarily disclosed

T45 4th and 5th year after voluntarily disclosed
2 years since last inspection
3 years since last inspection
4 or more years since last inspection
Number of violations 1 year ago
Number of violations 2 years ago
Any enforcement actions 1 year ago
Any enforcement actions 2 years ago
Compliance Incentive Program target
National Priority sector
Log total CAA penalties in the state-year
Log number of CAA-regulated
facilities in the state-year
Facility-level conditional fixed effects
Fixed effects for t years
before/after match year
Year fixed effects (1994-2003)
Observations
Facilities
Wald chi-squared
Wald tests of indistinguishable coefficients:

0.081
[0.115]
-0.191
[0.145]
-0.609**
[0.165]
-0.854**
[0.209]
0.372**
[0.022]
0.539**
[0.029]
1.180**
[0.029]
0.159*
[0.065]
0.031
[0.063]
-0.230**
[0.082]
-0.177*
[0.089]
0.051
[0.040]
0.280**
[0.033]
0.013+
[0.008]
1.385**
[0.095]
Included
Included

1.08
0.83
0.54
0.43
1.45
1.71
3.25
1.17
1.03
0.79
0.84
1.05
1.32
1.01
4.00

(2)
Conditional fixed-effects
negative binomial regression
Number of annual inspections
Matched sample
Coefficients
Incident rate
ratios
-0.039
[0.058]
-0.107+
[0.064]
-0.232**
[0.068]
-0.393**
[0.076]
0.126**
[0.013]
0.232**
[0.020]
0.619**
[0.018]
0.026
[0.026]
-0.010
[0.028]
-0.036
[0.039]
-0.033
[0.042]
0.050*
[0.021]
0.101**
0.017]
-0.012**
[0.005]
0.624**
[0.046]
Included
Included

0.96
0.90
0.79
0.68
1.13
1.26
1.86
1.03
0.99
0.96
0.97
1.05
1.11
0.99
1.87

Included
82,287
94,270
13,673
16,078
3058.7**
4134.7**
T1 = T2:
χ2=3.26+
T1 = T2:
χ2=0.89
2
T1 = T3:
χ =16.97**
χ2=6.25*
T1 = T3:
2
T1 = T45: χ =18.15**
T1 = T45: χ2=17.62**
Note. Brackets contain standard errors, clustered by facility in Model 1. See notes to Table 2. Compare results to
inspection frequency average treatment effect models reported in Columns 2 and 4 of Table 2.
+ p<0.10; * p<0.05; ** p<0.01.
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Table A2. Regulatory compliance annual treatment effect model
Conditional fixed-effects logistic regression
Dependent variable: Clean inspection
Matched sample
Coefficient
Odds ratio
T1

1st year after voluntarily disclosed

T2

2nd year after voluntarily disclosed

T3

3rd year after voluntarily disclosed

T45

4th and 5th year after voluntarily disclosed
Probability of an inspection (predicted)
Number of inspections 1 year ago
Number of inspections 2 years ago
Number of violations 1 year ago
Number of violations 2 years ago
Facility-level conditional fixed-effects
Fixed effects for t years before/after match year
Fixed effects for two-year periods (1994/5-2002/3)
Observations (inspections)
Facilities
Wald chi-squared
Wald tests of indistinguishable coefficients:

0.248
[0.347]
0.459
[0.457]
1.541*
[0.754]
2.766**
[1.002]
0.242
[0.584]
-0.231**
[0.075]
-0.122
[0.076]
1.201**
[0.203]
1.208**
[0.203]
Included
Included a
Included
4174
713
158.9**
T1 = T2:
T1 = T3:
T1 = T45:

1.29
1.59
4.70
15.98
1.29
0.79
0.88
3.32
3.34

χ2=0.23
χ2=2.92+
χ2=6.47*

Note. Brackets contain standard errors clustered by facility. See notes to Table 3. Compare results to
regulatory compliance average treatment effect model reported in Column 2 of Table 3.
+ p<0.10; * p<0.05; ** p<0.01.
a
To overcome collinearity with the year fixed effects that prevented the model from converging, we
merged the dichotomous dummy variables 4 years after match year and 5 years after match year into a
single dichotomous variable.
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Table A3. Abnormal release annual treatment effect model
Conditional fixed-effects negative binomial regression
Dependent Variable: Number of abnormal releases
Matched sample
Coefficients
Incident rate
ratio
T1

1st year after voluntarily disclosed

T2

2nd year after voluntarily disclosed

T3

3rd year after voluntarily disclosed

T45 4th and 5th year after voluntarily disclosed
Log production ratio
Log employment
Facility-level conditional fixed-effects
Year fixed effects (1994-2003)
Fixed effects for t years before/after match year
Observations
Facilities
Model Wald Chi-squared
Wald tests of indistinguishable coefficients:

-0.208**
[0.060]
-0.199**
[0.061]
-0.274**
[0.068]
-0.261**
[0.07]
0.011
[0.033]
0.002
[0.010]
Included
Included
Included
30,919
5,582
9811.7**
T1 = T2:
T1 = T3:
T1 = T45:

0.81
0.82
0.76
0.77
1.01
1.00

χ2=0.01
χ2=0.76
χ2=0.39

Note. Brackets contain standard errors. See notes to Table 4. Compare results to abnormal release
average treatment effect model reported in Column 2 of Table 4.
+ p<0.10; * p<0.05; ** p<0.01.
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